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Abstract
We analyze the competitive eﬀects of backward vertical integration in a model with
oligopolistic ﬁrms that exert market power upstream and downstream. In contrast to pre-
vious literature, we show that a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive
because eﬃciency eﬀects dominate foreclosure eﬀects. Moreover, vertical integration even
to monopoly can be procompetitive. With regard to market structure, we ﬁnd, somewhat
surprisingly, that vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is
more concentrated. Our model thus suggests that antitrust authorities should be particu-
larly wary of vertical integration in relatively competitive industries. We demonstrate that
the quantitative welfare eﬀects can be substantial there.
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11 Introduction
The eﬀects of vertical integration on consumer and overall welfare are subject of ongoing
debates amongst economists, antitrust lawyers, and policy makers. Over the last two decades
substantial progress has been made in identifying pro- and anticompetitive eﬀects of vertical
integration. Productivity increases due to cost synergies have been advanced as a major source
of eﬃciency gains from vertical integration while the ability of integrating parties to raise their
rivals’ costs has been recognized as a factor fostering foreclosure.1 Yet an open theoretical
question of substantial practical relevance is how these eﬀects depend on the underlying market
structure. In particular, is vertical integration more likely to harm consumers when the industry
is otherwise highly competitive, or should antitrust authorities be more vigilant when the
integrating ﬁrm’s competitors exert substantial market power?
To shed light on these questions we present a model that permits us to study the competitive
eﬀects of vertical integration as a function of the underlying market structure and of the
historically given degree of vertical integration, taking into account both productivity gains
and incentives to raise rivals’ costs. The following is a sketch of our model, which builds
on Riordan (1998). There are a number of non-integrated ﬁrms and one partly vertically
integrated ﬁrm. All ﬁrms exert oligopolistic market power downstream, where they compete ` a
la Cournot, and oligopsonistic market power upstream. To produce the ﬁnal good, ﬁrms need a
ﬁxed input, termed capacity, that is competitively oﬀered on an upward sloping supply curve.
The more capacity a ﬁrm buys on the market, the lower is its marginal cost of producing the
ﬁnal good. The vertically integrated ﬁrm owns some capacity at the outset. This is referred to
as its ex ante degree of vertical integration and can be as low as zero or so large that the ﬁrm
eﬀectively monopolizes the market (or anything in between). As the ex ante degree of vertical
integration increases, the marginal cost of the integrated ﬁrm decreases, and so it produces
more output. Thus, our model explicitly allows for productivity gains from vertical integration
due to economies of scale.2 However, because the cost of acquiring the inframarginal units of
capacity is sunk by the time the integrated ﬁrm interacts with the other ﬁrms on the input
1For recent surveys on the eﬀects of vertical integration, see Church (2008), Rey and Tirole (2007) and
Riordan (2008).
2Such productivity gains are not only commonly advanced by merging parties as motivation for their desire
to vertically integrate but they are also well documented empirically (see e.g., Horta¸ csu and Syverson, 2007).
Church (2008) argues that one of the reasons why vertical mergers are complicated to evaluate is that the
incentives to integrate often arise because of non-price eﬃciencies and are usually not attributable to market
power eﬀects.
2market, it bids more aggressively for capacity. Therefore, increases in its ex ante degree of
vertical integration lead to increases in the market price of capacity, which raises its rivals’
costs and thus leads to (partial) foreclosure.
Within this setup, we obtain the following results. First, vertical integration is more likely
to be procompetitive (i) the more concentrated is the industry, i.e., the fewer are the non-
integrated competitors, and (ii) the smaller is the ex ante degree of integration.3 While result
(ii) is arguably as one would expect, result (i) is somewhat surprising.4 However, a clear
intuition for this result based on our model exists and will be provided below. The result
implies that antitrust authorities should be more suspicious about vertical mergers when there
are more ﬁrms in the industry. We also demonstrate that the eﬀects from vertical integration
on consumer surplus can be substantial even if the number of ﬁrms is large. Second, vertical
integration is procompetitive under a fairly wide array of circumstances. In the extreme, even
monopolizing the downstream market can enhance consumer welfare because the integrated
ﬁrm expands its quantity by a very large extent after integrating.5 Third, we show that as
the number of competitors becomes large, vertical integration is anticompetitive irrespective
of the ex ante degree of vertical integration. In the limit, our model thus yields Riordan’s
(1998) powerful result that vertical integration by a dominant ﬁrm who faces a competitive
fringe is always anticompetitive.6 Fourth, even if it is procompetitive, vertical integration is
not necessarily welfare increasing. Procompetitive but welfare reducing mergers are possible
because vertical integration changes the cost structure in the industry. Last, there exist critical
thresholds for input and output market shares for an integrating ﬁrm above which further
vertical integration is anticompetitive. These are useful measures for practical antitrust policy
purposes.
Let us now develop the basic intuition for these results, starting with a few preliminaries.
Since the downstream market is Cournot, ﬁrms with lower marginal costs produce larger quan-
tities. This implies that ﬁrms with lower marginal costs incur larger inframarginal losses from
3Two remarks on terminology are in order. First, “procompetitive” (“anticompetitive”) eﬀects are a short-
hand expression for saying that consumer prices fall (increase) due to increases in the ex ante degree of vertical
integration. Second, when we say that something is more (less) likely we mean that it occurs for a larger (smaller)
set in the parameter space.
4For example, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) note that most empirical studies on vertical integration are
conducted for highly concentrated markets because evidence for foreclosure is thought most likely to be found
there.
5This point is related to but distinct from Quirmbach (1986)’s observation that consumer prices fall after
vertical integration to monopoly is complete. Our result is that consumer prices can fall along all the way
towards complete foreclosure.
6This means also that the dominant ﬁrm model provides a good approximation to nearby market structures.
3a price decrease. Therefore, a ﬁrm with a larger capacity produces at lower marginal cost but
utilizes its capacity less intensively. Conversely, ﬁrms with little market power have marginal
costs that are approximately equal to price—like fringe ﬁrms in the model with a dominant ﬁrm
facing a competitive fringe— and utilize their capacity very intensively. By increasing its degree
of vertical integration, the integrated ﬁrm reduces the capacity available to rival ﬁrms because
the market clearing input price increases. Vertical integration has the strongest negative eﬀect
on consumer welfare if rival ﬁrms have little to no market power. Operating already close to
the point where marginal costs equal price, their only way to adapt is to decrease their output.
On the other hand, if rival ﬁrms exert market power themselves, the anticompetitive eﬀect of
reducing the capacity available to them will be partly oﬀset because smaller capacities induce
them to use capacity more intensively. In other words, market power of rival ﬁrms mitigates
the anticompetitive foreclosure eﬀect of vertical integration.
Based on these preliminary observations, rather intuitive explanations for our main results
are now at hand. As the number of competitors increases, the market power of each of them
decreases, which makes vertical integration more likely to be anticompetitive. This is also the
reason why in the limit as the number of ﬁrms grows very large, our model encompasses the
case with a dominant ﬁrm who faces a competitive fringe, in which vertical integration is always
anticompetitive.
When the ex ante degree of vertical integration increases, the integrated ﬁrm bids more
aggressively on the capacity market, as noted above. Thereby it increases its total capacity and
decreases the capacity of the non-integrated ﬁrms. This has opposite eﬀects on their capacity
utilization, implying that output expansion of the integrated ﬁrm becomes smaller relative to
output reduction of non-integrated ﬁrms. Therefore, vertical integration is more likely to be
anticompetitive the larger is the integrated ﬁrm’s ex ante degree of vertical integration.
There is, however, an at least partially oﬀ-setting eﬀect. The aggregate capacity employed
in the industry becomes larger as integration increases. Depending on the given competitiveness
of the industry, this eﬀect can dominate the anticompetitive eﬀects just mentioned, so that even
vertical integration up to monopoly can be procompetitive.
Vertical integration shifts capacity to the integrated ﬁrm that utilizes it less intensively.
This results in higher aggregate costs of production, which may render vertical integration
welfare reducing even if it is consumer welfare enhancing.
Our paper is most closely related to Riordan (1998), whose setup includes a dominant,
4partly integrated ﬁrm facing a competitive fringe. We extend this by allowing the integrated
ﬁrm’s competitors to exert market power as well. Riordan’s model is a notable exception
within the theoretical literature on vertical integration because it incorporates exertion of
market power in both markets whereas most of this literature is concerned with the trade-oﬀ
between avoidance of double marginalization and foreclosure. For example, Hart and Tirole
(1990), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990) and Chen and Riordan (2007) are only concerned
with foreclosure motives. In Salinger (1988), Choi and Yi (2000), Chen (2001) and Inderst
and Valletti (2011a), the downstream market is comprised of an oligopoly and both eﬀects are
present but downstream ﬁrms have no market power in the intermediate goods market.7
A diﬀerent approach to vertical integration is developed by De Fontenay and Gans (2005),8
in which there is eﬃcient bilateral bargaining between pairs of upstream and downstream
ﬁrms.9 As Gans (2007) notes, the bargaining approach ﬁts relatively well to an industry with
few upstream and downstream ﬁrms while in our model the input is supplied competitively,
which corresponds to general mass markets for inputs.
A paper that, like ours, considers a competitive upstream industry is Es¨ o, Nocke, and White
(2010). They study a model in which competing downstream ﬁrms bid for scarce upstream
capacity and show that if this capacity is suﬃciently large, the asymmetric downstream market
structure analyzed here and in Riordan (1998) emerges endogenously.10
As in most of the literature, we consider the case of one-shot interaction between ﬁrms.
An important exception is the paper by Nocke and White (2007),11 who consider a dynamic
model and show that vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion because it reduces the
number of buyers for rival ﬁrms, which decreases their incentives to deviate from a collusive
agreement.12
7Hendricks and McAfee (2010) present a model with both eﬀects, where upstream and downstream ﬁrms
exert market power in the intermediate goods market. However, when analyzing vertical mergers, they keep
the downstream price ﬁxed and suppose that the market structure consists of no vertical integration at the
outset in order to keep the model tractable. Under these assumptions they show that output increases with
vertical mergers. In contrast, in our model the downstream price is ﬂexible and, as argued above, we show that a
crucial variable to determine the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration is the degree to which there is already
integration.
8This approach is used by Gans (2007) to derive concentration measures for vertical and horizontal mergers
in an oligopolistic vertical market structure.
9For a related analysis of vertical integration with multilateral bargaining, see Bolton and Whinston (1993).
10Inderst and Valletti (2011b) consider a model with take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers of an upstream ﬁrm but without
vertical integration. They allow for one buyer to be larger than the others and show that this buyer obtains a
favorable deal because its outside option is higher. However, this leads to higher wholesale prices for rival buyers
to the detriment of consumers.
11For a similar, analysis but with a diﬀerent upstream pricing regime, see Normann (2009).
12We also concentrate on the case of a single (or marginal) vertical merger. Recently, Nocke and Whinston
5Our model is also broadly consistent with recent evidence. In a comprehensive review of
empirical studies on the eﬀects of vertical integration for several highly concentrated industries,
Lafontaine and Slade (2007) ﬁnd that the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the foreclosure eﬀect in
almost all studies, and that, therefore, vertical integration has led to a fall in the ﬁnal good
price in almost all cases. In a similar vein, Horta¸ csu and Syverson (2007) ﬁnd that vertical
integration in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries has led to output increases and
price decreases and show that these eﬀects can be attributed to productivity increases that
arise from ﬁrm size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and Section
3 presents the equilibrium. In Section 4 we derive the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration
and show how these eﬀects change with the competitiveness of the industry. Section 5 analyzes
the eﬀects of vertical integration on social welfare and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in
the appendix.
2 The Model
There are two types of ﬁrms, one (partially) vertically integrated ﬁrm, which we index by
I and N ≥ 1 non-integrated ﬁrms. A typical non-integrated ﬁrm is indexed by j. All ﬁrms
produce a homogenous good and compete ` a la Cournot on the downstream market. The inverse
demand function is P(Q), where P(Q) is the market clearing price for the aggregate quantity
Q ≡ qI +
 N
j=1qj satisfying P′(Q) < 0. To produce the ﬁnal good ﬁrms require a ﬁxed input,








where kj is ﬁrm j’s capacity and C′(qj/kj) ≥ 0 and C′′(qj/kj) > 0.13 Capacity is combined
with variable inputs to produce the ﬁnal good. This cost function is more general than most
cost functions used in models of vertical integration since it allows a ﬁrm to vary its quantity
for given capacity. In particular, it is more general than the widely used ﬁxed proportions cost
function which allows a ﬁrm to produce only a maximal quantity of output for a given quantity
of input. The cost function is a good description of a ﬁrm’s production technology whenever
(2010) considered the case in which multiple horizontal mergers might arise over time and showed under which
conditions the optimal policy for an antitrust authority is myopic.
13This type of cost function was introduced by Perry (1978) and used e.g., by Perry and Porter (1985), Riordan
(1998) and Hendricks and McAfee (2010).
6the capacity input reduces marginal costs but does not prevent the ﬁrm from substituting
this input for other, more expensive inputs. This appears to be an appropriate description
of the production process in a variety of industries in which the availability of a scare input
factor has the eﬀect of reducing the marginal cost of production. Examples include landline
telecommunication, the concrete industry and the steel industry, where the cost reducing input
is ﬁbre-optic cable, cement and iron ore, respectively.14 The integrated ﬁrm I has a cost







As a consequence, marginal costs for all ﬁrms are increasing in the produced quantity for given
capacity but c(qi,ki) exhibits constant returns to scale in qi and ki, i = I,1,...,N.
Capacity is supplied competitively with an inverse supply function of R(K), with R′(K) > 0
and K ≡ kI +
 N
j=1 kj. Firm I is partially vertically integrated, that is, it owns k ≥ 0 units of
capacity. We refer to k as its ex ante degree of vertical integration.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the ﬁrst stage, the capacity stage, all ﬁrms i
simultaneously choose their level of capacity ki. The ex ante degree of vertical integration k is
exogenously given and common knowledge. Firm I buys kI −k units of capacity at the market
price R(K). Thus, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm I at the capacity stage is given by





+ γqI − (kI − k)R(K), (1)
and the one of a non-integrated ﬁrm j is Πj(qj,kj) = P(Q)qj − kjC (qj/kj) − kjR(K). In
the second stage, the quantity stage, all ﬁrms simultaneously choose their quantities after
having observed all capacity levels k = (kI,k1,..,kN). The aggregate quantity Q determines
the market clearing price P(Q), and payoﬀs are realized.
Equation (1) implies that ﬁrm I has the opportunity to supply undesired capacity to an
outside market, which occurs if kI < k. Notice that the cost of acquiring k, which we do not
model, is sunk by the time ﬁrm I acquires kI on the input market. Therefore, an increase in
the degree of vertical integration reduces the number of inframarginal units of capacity kI − k
on which the integrated ﬁrm bears the market clearing price R(K) when buying additional
14For a detailed description of the concrete industry, see e.g., Syverson (2008), and for an analysis of vertical
mergers in the steel industry, see Mullin and Mullin (1997).
15One can also interpret γ as a quality advantage of the integrated ﬁrm’s product. Throughout the paper we
assume that γ is small.
7units of capacity.16 As we will see shortly, this reduction in the number of inframarginal units
induces the integrated ﬁrm to bid more aggressively on the input market.
We focus on symmetric subgame perfect equilibria, where symmetry means that the non-
integrated ﬁrms play the same strategies. To ensure interior solutions and a unique equilibrium,
we make some shape assumptions on the demand, supply and cost function. We suppose that
limQ→∞ P(Q) = 0, that P′′(Q) is not too positive and that P′′′(Q), C′′′(qi/ki) and R′′(K) are
not too negative. These assumptions are relatively mild and guarantee a unique equilibrium.
A special case that satisﬁes these assumptions is the linear-quadratic model, in which P(Q) =













all j ∈ {1,...,N}, where α,β,c and δ are positive constants.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction.
3.1 The Quantity Stage (Stage 2)
At the quantity stage, k is already determined. Since k has a direct eﬀect only on kI but not
on qI, the ﬁrst-order condition for a proﬁt maximum for each ﬁrm does not depend directly on
k. So, the ﬁrst-order condition of a non-integrated ﬁrm j  = I in the subgame of the quantity
stage is given by17
P + P′qj = C′
j, (2)
while the ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm I is given by
P + P′qI = C′
I − γ. (3)
It is easy to see that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed given that P′′ is not too positive,
which we assumed above. Our assumptions also imply that ﬁrm i’s reaction function has a
negative slope greater than −1. Therefore, every quantity-stage subgame has a unique equilib-
rium. We denote by q∗
i(k) the equilibrium quantity of ﬁrm i, given any vector of capacities k.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions we get the following intuitive lemma.
16Observe also that although the integrated ﬁrms’s cost of acquiring k is sunk, the social cost of producing k
is taken into account in this formulation because R(.) depends on K rather than only K − k.
17To simplify notation, in the following we abbreviate P(Q) by P, C (qi/ki) by Ci and R(K) by R. We do so









< 0 for all i  = j, i,j = I,1,...,N. (4)
Therefore, all own eﬀects are positive and all cross eﬀects are negative. That is, a ﬁrm’s optimal
quantity increases in its own capacity and falls in the capacity of its rivals, independently of




ki decreases in ki ∀i ∈ {I,1,...,N}.
The same result is obtained by Riordan (1998). As observed above, a ﬁrm with a larger capacity
produces a larger quantity, but because it produces more inframarginal units, it suﬀers more
from a fall in the ﬁnal output price. As a consequence, it utilizes its capacity less intensively
than ﬁrms with lower capacity. This means that q∗
i/ki is smaller.
3.2 The Capacity Stage (Stage 1)
We now move on to the ﬁrst stage of the game, the capacity choice game. Using the envelope
theorem and dropping all arguments, the ﬁrst-order condition of a non-integrated ﬁrm j in the












− R − kjR′ = 0, (5)
where Q∗
−j is the equilibrium quantity of all ﬁrms but ﬁrm j. The ﬁrst-order condition of the












− R − (kI − k)R′ = 0. (6)
Showing that an equilibrium exists and, if it does, is unique is more involved in the capacity
stage than in the quantity stage. The reason is that now a change in ﬁrm i’s capacity has an
eﬀect on the equilibrium quantity of each ﬁrm in the second stage. Thus, the expression for the
reaction function is more complicated than in a standard single stage game.18 Nevertheless,
the next lemma establishes that an equilibrium exists and is indeed unique.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the capacity stage. In this equilib-
rium, k∗
I and k∗
j, j = 1,...,N, are determined by (5) and (6).
18Moreover, the game is not an aggregative game. The reaction of a non-integrated ﬁrm is diﬀerent if ﬁrm I
changes its capacity than if a non-integrated ﬁrm changes its capacity because this has diﬀerent eﬀects on the
overall quantity produced in the second stage.









< 0, j = 1,...,N.
This result, that k∗
I increases and k∗
j decreases in k, is intuitive. If k increases, ﬁrm I owns
more capacity units. Thus, the number of inframarginal units for which it has to pay the ca-
pacity price R on the upstream market decreases. As a consequence, ﬁrm I ﬁnds it optimal to
increase its overall amount of capacity.19 While k does not directly inﬂuence the optimal capac-
ity of the non-integrated ﬁrms, the price of capacity increases because k∗
I increases. Therefore,
each non-integrated ﬁrm optimally acquires less capacity as k rises. Hence, non-integrated
ﬁrms become (partially) foreclosed as k increases.
It follows immediately from Lemma 4 that k∗
I > k∗
j for k > 0, even if γ = 0. Thus, if ﬁrm
I is vertically integrated to some extent, its equilibrium capacity is larger than the one of the
non-integrated ﬁrms. From Lemma 2 we know that this implies that its capacity utilization
q∗
I/k∗
I is lower than for the non-integrated ﬁrms.
4 Competitive Eﬀects of Vertical Integration
We now turn to the analysis of the eﬀects of vertical integration on consumer surplus.
4.1 Competitive Threshold
We ﬁrst analyze under which conditions vertical integration is pro - or anticompetitive, i.e.,
whether a marginal change in k increases or decreases the aggregate equilibrium quantity
supplied in the downstream market. From above it follows that an increase in k has a direct
positive eﬀect on kI and via that an indirect negative eﬀect on all kj.20 This in turn leads to
an increase in qI and to a decrease in all qj. Thus, vertical integration is procompetitive at the


























> 0, i  = j,

















dkj + (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
 , i  = j. (7)
19The eﬀect is similar to the one arising from price caps (or ﬂoors) that may induce ﬁrms to behave more
aggressively by shifting the balance from inframarginal losses to marginal gains.
20To simplify notation here and in what follows we omit the superscript ∗ on equilibrium quantities and
capacities.
10The left-hand side of (7) expresses the relative change of a non-integrated ﬁrm’s capacity with
k to the change in the integrated ﬁrm’s capacity at the equilibrium. We know from Lemma 4
that this relative change is negative. The right-hand side gives a benchmark against which to
compare this term. The inequality says that if the relative change is small enough in absolute
terms, then vertical integration is procompetitive. Intuitively, if kj does not fall by much after
ﬁrm I becomes more integrated, the positive eﬀect resulting from the increase in qI dominates
the negative eﬀect that stems from the decrease in qj of all non-integrated ﬁrms.
Inserting the respective derivatives (derived in the proof of Lemma 1) into the right-hand






















To gain some intuition for this formula suppose that both k and γ are zero. In this case all N+1
ﬁrms are the same and we have qI = qj, kI = kj and thus C′′
I = C′′
j . As a consequence, the
right-hand side of (8) simpliﬁes to −1/N, so that all ﬁrms have the same capacity utilization.
Thus, to keep overall output constant, the aggregate capacity reduction of the non-integrated
ﬁrms must be the same as the increase in the capacity of ﬁrm I. Since all N non-integrated ﬁrms
are symmetric, each of them must lower its capacity by 1/N of the increase in the integrated
ﬁrm’s capacity.
Suppose now that γ = 0 but k > 0. From the above lemmas we know that in this case
kI > kj, qI/kI < qj/kj and thus C′′
I < C′′
j . Then, the right-hand side of (8) is in absolute value
smaller than 1/N. The reason is that the integrated ﬁrm uses its capacity less intensively than
a non-integrated ﬁrm. As a consequence, if all non-integrated ﬁrms reduced their capacity
in sum by the same amount as the capacity increase of the integrated ﬁrm, overall output
would fall since capacity is shifted to the less eﬃcient ﬁrm. Thus, to keep output constant the
reduction in capacity by non-integrated ﬁrms has to be smaller and overall capacity must rise.
To characterize how vertical integration changes overall output, we begin with the case
where k is small.
Proposition 1 For any ﬁnite N there exists a competitive threshold k∗ > 0, such that for all
k < k∗, vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin.
Intuitively, if k is small, ﬁrm I uses its capacity more intensively than a non-integrated ﬁrm
if its cost advantage γ is large enough or only slightly less intensively if γ is small. However,
11the aggregate reaction of the non-integrated ﬁrms to an increase in k is always smaller than
the increase in k∗
I. Thus, the aggregate capacity that is used increases and overall output rises.
Next assume that k is so large that the equilibrium value of k∗
I is large enough to induce
k∗
j = 0 for all j  = I and deﬁne ¯ k as the ex ante degree of vertical integration at which k∗
j = 0.
Observe that this implies q∗
j = 0. In words, at k = ¯ k, only the integrated ﬁrm is active and the
market is monopolized.21 Accordingly, we refer to the case where k approaches ¯ k as vertical
integration to monopoly.
Proposition 2 For any ﬁnite N, vertical integration to monopoly can be procompetitive at the
margin.
Thus, even marginal vertical integration that leads to a complete foreclosure of rival ﬁrms
by the integrated ﬁrm is not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare. In addition, as we
will show below, vertical integration to monopoly may not only be locally procompetitive, i.e.
when k is close to ¯ k, but also globally, i.e. for any k ∈ [0,¯ k). This implies that starting from any
k ∈ [0,¯ k) vertical integration to ¯ k may maximize consumer welfare. This is the case because
our model explicitly takes into account eﬃciency gains in production beyond pure avoidance of
double marginalization. If a ﬁrm acquires such a large amount of capacity that its competitors
stop producing, its production costs become so low that it may produce a quantity that is
larger than the oligopoly quantity without the capacity increase.
Even though according to Proposition 2 vertical integration to monopoly can be procom-
petitive, it need not necessarily be so. The reason is that ﬁrm I utilizes its capacity less and
less intensively as k rises. Thus, for vertical integration to be procompetitive, the decrease in
kj (relative to the increase in kI) as a reaction to the rise in k must get smaller and smaller as
k rises.
We now turn to the analysis of intermediate values of k, that is, values of k ∈ (k∗,¯ k). It is of
particular interest to explore if there is a unique threshold of k below which vertical integration
is procompetitive and above which vertical integration is anticompetitive. Moreover, if no such
threshold exists, is vertical integration procompetitive over the whole range from 0 to ¯ k? The
expressions that are involved in the calculations are too complicated to allow us to answer this
21Such a ¯ k necessarily exists since from Lemma 4 we know that dkI/dk > 0 and dkj/dk < 0. In addition,
variable production costs c(qj,kj) are decreasing in kj since C
′′(qj/kj) > 0. Thus, both production and capacity
costs are increasing in k for a non-integrated ﬁrm j, while revenue is decreasing because qj is decreasing and
qI is increasing. So if k and therewith kI is large enough, j’s costs are too high relative to P(Q), and so it is
optimal for ﬁrm j to stop producing.
12question in general. Nonetheless, we are able to show that the threshold, provided it exists, is
indeed unique for two important subclasses of the general speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst class consists
of models where the supply function R(K) is very inelastic.22 The second class is the widely
used linear-quadratic speciﬁcation introduced above.
Proposition 3 Suppose either that (i) the supply function R(K) is very inelastic, i.e., R′(K)
is large, or that (ii) the model is linear-quadratic. Then, for any ﬁnite N vertical integration
is always procompetitive or there exists a unique k∗ ∈ (0, ¯ k), such that vertical integration is
procompetitive at the margin for all k < k∗ and anticompetitive at the margin for all k > k∗.
The intuition for case (i) of the proposition is that if R(K) is very inelastic, the capacity reaction
of a non-integrated ﬁrm to a change in kI, and therefore also to a change in k, is independent
of the value of k. Therefore, (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) stays constant as k varies. However, the right-
hand side of (8) is strictly increasing since ﬁrm I utilizes its capacity less and less intensively
with further integration. Thus, there is a unique intersection point between the left-hand and
the right-hand-side of (8). Case (ii) of the proposition is important because it shows that the
threshold is unique (given that it exists) in the general linear-quadratic speciﬁcation used in
many industrial organization models. In addition, this indicates that the threshold is unique
also for speciﬁcations that are close to the linear-quadratic one and suggests that the threshold
may be unique even more generally.23
Our result that the eﬃciency gains of vertical integration are often larger than the fore-
closure eﬀects is in contrast to the results of the dominant ﬁrm model. In the dominant ﬁrm
model, vertical integration leads to foreclosure of fringe ﬁrms. However, since fringe ﬁrms have
no market power, their marginal cost is equal to the ﬁnal consumer price, implying that some
of them exit the market as a consequence of foreclosure. This has highly detrimental eﬀects
on the aggregate output because fringe ﬁrms utilize their capacity intensively. By contrast, in
the case of an oligopoly, the non-integrated ﬁrms also exert market power and restrict their
output to keep the ﬁnal goods price high. As a consequence of the foreclosure through vertical
22A steeply increasing supply curve can be observed in many high technological industries. For example,
dedicated ﬁber-optic cables or several semiconductor devices like customized integrated circuits that are produced
in specialized plants exhibit large production costs that are steeply increasing once a plant produces close to
its capacity limit. Often, a ﬁrm, which also produces downstream products, already owns some of these plants
while other ﬁrms need to acquire the specialized inputs from scratch. In our terminology, the ﬁrm that owns
some plants would be considered vertically integrated.
23It may also be worth mentioning that, although we tried several diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we have not found
any counterexamples, i.e., cases where the left-hand and right-hand side of (8) are the same for diﬀerent values
of k.
13integration, a rival ﬁrm lowers its quantity to a smaller extent than the exit of a fringe ﬁrm
reduces ﬁnal output in the dominant ﬁrm model. Moreover, as vertical integration increases,
each rival ﬁrm in the oligopoly case buys a smaller amount of capacity and produces at a
higher marginal costs, so that its capacity utilization increases. As a result, in the dominant
ﬁrm model the output contraction of fringe ﬁrms after foreclosure is larger than the reaction
of rival ﬁrms under oligopoly.
4.2 Anticompetitive Integration in Competitive Industries
We now consider the eﬀect of a change in the number of ﬁrms on the competitive eﬀects of
vertical integration. Understanding how these eﬀects depend on the competitive structure of
the industry is particularly relevant for antitrust policy implications. We start by looking at the
case in which the number of downstream ﬁrms becomes large. This case is also of interest from
a theoretical perspective because this limit corresponds to the model Riordan (1998) analyzes.
Proposition 4 If N → ∞, then vertical integration is anticompetitive for all k ∈ [0,¯ k].
Hence, if the downstream market becomes perfectly competitive, vertical integration is
always anticompetitive. Intuitively, the aggregate reaction of the non-integrated ﬁrms to an
increase in k is larger, the more ﬁrms are in the market. Therefore, the aggregate capacity
reduction and, hence, the quantity reduction of the non-integrated ﬁrms increases in their
number. As N goes to inﬁnity this eﬀect dominates any cost advantage of the integrated ﬁrm.
Thus in the limit, as the market power of the non-integrated ﬁrms vanishes, we obtain the
result of Riordan (1998). As the integrated ﬁrm has no ﬁrst-mover advantage in our model,
but has one in Riordan’s, Proposition 4 also shows that his strong result stems genuinely from
the dominant ﬁrm’s market power rather than from the ﬁrst-mover advantage.24
We now turn to the case of N being ﬁnite, and analyze how k∗ changes with N. From
the previous subsection we know that a unique threshold k∗ exists in the linear-quadratic
speciﬁcation and if the supply function is steep. For tractability reasons we therefore restrict
ourselves to these cases. In the following, we denote the threshold as k∗(N) to explicitly account
for its dependence on N.
We start with the case of R′(K) being large. Here we obtain the following result:









k∗(N) at γ = 0
k∗(N) at γ = 0.1
Figure 1: The competitive threshold k∗(N) in the linear-quadratic model.
Proposition 5 Suppose that R′(K) is large. If C( )′′′ is relatively small and C′′
j ≈ C′′
I , then
k∗(N) is strictly decreasing in N.
Although Proposition 5 is restricted by the assumptions that C( )′′′ is relatively small and
C′′
j ≈ C′′
I , our general insight does not seem to be conﬁned to this case. In fact, it is easy to
demonstrate numerically that the result also holds if the above assumptions are relaxed.
Proposition 5 shows that the more competitive the industry gets, i.e., the larger is the
number of ﬁrms, the more likely it is that vertical integration reduces consumer welfare. While
the result may come as a surprise at ﬁrst glance, the intuition behind it is relatively simple.
If the number of ﬁrms is larger, each non-integrated ﬁrm becomes smaller and utilizes its
capacity more intensively. Since the non-integrated ﬁrms are foreclosed through integration,
overall capacity utilization in the industry falls. This eﬀect is more likely to dominate the fact
that integration leads to an increase in the overall capacity if the industry is more competitive.
Numerical computations also demonstrate that the threshold k∗(N) decreases in N for
the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation. This is illustrated in Figure 1.25 The ﬁgure also shows that
k∗(N) is larger for larger values of γ, i.e., vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive
the larger is the cost advantage of the integrated ﬁrm. This result is intuitive since vertical
integration shifts capacity to the ﬁrm that produces more eﬃciently. When this eﬃciency
25Figure 6 in Appendix B[not for publication] also shows that qualitatively the results do not vary with γ.
The numerical computations are based on the parameterization α = β = c = δ = 1. For N = 1 and N = 2,










Figure 2: Changes in CS(k) when k increases marginally in % of CS(k) when I’s downstream
market share is kept at 50%.
diﬀerence is larger, the output increase of the integrated ﬁrm is also larger.
4.3 Quantifying the Eﬀects of Vertical Integration
So far we have been focusing on the direction or sign of output changes upon vertical integration.
This leaves open the question how important these eﬀects are quantitatively, in particular,
because one might guess that the eﬀects are relatively small in competitive industries. We now
demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case.
There is obviously a multitude of ways of presenting these quantitative eﬀects. One way
that we ﬁnd insightful is to consider, as a function of N, the percentage change in consumer
surplus when the integrated ﬁrm’s degree of vertical integration increases marginally, keeping
the integrated ﬁrm’s downstream market share ﬁxed at some given level. Figure 2 displays
the change in consumer surplus for the linear-quadratic model when the degree of vertical
integration increases marginally. This is expressed as a percentage of consumer surplus before
the increase, with k chosen such that for any given N, the vertical integrated ﬁrm’s downstream
market share is 50%.26,27 The results displayed in Figure 2 show that the marginal eﬀect of
vertical integration is positive and large when N is small and negative yet still sizeable in
absolute terms when N is large. Additionally, vertical integration is often not a continuous
process but involves acquiring a non-negligible fraction of the intermediate good market. Thus,
the computation shows that even in higly competitive industries, the absolute eﬀect of a discrete
vertical merger is sizeable.




1/2. Here, 0.01 is the smallest increment for changes in k that we used in our simulations.
27This exercise is also insightful as it captures the way in which many antitrust authorities may think about










Figure 3: The diﬀerence in consumer surplus between vertical integration to monopoly and no
vertical integration, i.e., CS(¯ k) − CS(0), in % of CS(0).
Another important feature of our model is that vertical integration up to complete mo-
nopolization of the markets can enhance consumer surplus. Figure 3 illustrates the order of
magnitude of these eﬀects in the linear-quadratic model for γ = 0. It depicts the diﬀerence
in consumer surplus between vertical integration to monopoly and no vertical integration, i.e.,
CS(¯ k)−CS(0), as percentage of CS(0) as a function of N. If the only objective were to max-
imize consumer surplus and if the ex ante degree of vertical integration were 0, then vertical
integration that would lead to monopoly should be permitted when the number of competitors
is small absent vertical integration to monopoly but not when it is large.
At ﬁrst glance, it seems like a very intuitive proposition that vertical integration is most
harmful to consumers when competition is low but has little eﬀect when the industry is oth-
erwise highly competitive. This leads to the policy recommendation of prohibiting vertical
integration when N is small but not when it is large. Our numerical results show that such
intuitive, but in our model ultimately misguided policy recommendations can lead to mistakes
with substantial costs to consumers at both ends of the spectrum of market structures.
4.4 Partial Integration of all Firms
We now brieﬂy consider the case in which all ﬁrms with whom ﬁrm I competes have, at the
outset, the same degree of ex ante vertical integration kn ≥ 0 whereas ﬁrm I’s ex ante degree of
vertical integration is as before denoted k. We assume k ≥ kn and analyze further integration
by ﬁrm I.28 It is not hard to show that none of our previous results is aﬀected qualitatively by












Figure 4: The competitive threshold k∗(N,kn) with partially integrated competitors at γ = 0
as a function of N for kn ∈ {0,0.02,0.04,0.06}.
this change in assumptions.29 In particular, marginal vertical integration starting at k = kn is
always procompetitive. Moreover, vertical integration to monopoly can still be procompetititve,
in which case ﬁrm I’s rivals now sell their capacities to ﬁrm I or to an outside market upstream.
It is also informative to analyze how the competitive threshold, now denoted k∗(N,kn) to
explicitly account for its dependence on kn, varies with N and kn. This threshold is such that
for any smaller ex ante degree of vertical integration for ﬁrm I, i.e., for any k < k∗(N,kn),
vertical integration is procompetitive at the the margin. We do this analysis numerically for
the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation with γ = 0, for which the results can easily be computed.
Figure 4 depicts k∗(N,kn) for four values of kn. As one would expect based on the model with
kn = 0, k∗(N,kn) decreases in N. Interestingly, k∗(N,kn) increases in kn, which re-emphasizes
a theme that has emerged from this paper: Antitrust authorities should be less wary of vertical
integration the more market power the integrating ﬁrm’s competitors have. The intuition
behind this result is clear: When all ﬁrms are vertically integrated to some extent, the capacity
reduction of non-integrating ﬁrms following an increase in k is smaller than at kn = 0. These
ﬁrms do not bear the market price, R(K), on their kn inframarginal units, which makes them
less sensitive to increases in the input price. Thus, the foreclosure eﬀect from integration is
smaller when all ﬁrms are integrated to a positive degree at the outset. So we obtain again the
result that in an industry with several large ﬁrms, the eﬃciency eﬀect of vertical integration
dominates the foreclosure eﬀects.
29A sketch of the proof can be found in Appendix B [not intended for publication].
185 Welfare Eﬀects
So far we have only looked at the competitive eﬀects of vertical integration, i.e., if vertical
integration leads to an increase in overall quantity and thereby to an increase in consumer
surplus. Since competition authorities both in the U.S. and in Europe base their decisions
mainly on the eﬀects on consumer surplus, this analysis is most relevant for competition policy.
Yet, it is of equal importance to analyze the implications of vertical integration on social welfare,


















The ﬁrst term is gross consumer surplus, the second and third term are the variable cost of the
integrated ﬁrm while the fourth term represents the variable cost of all non-integrated ﬁrms.
The last term is the opportunity cost of capacity. Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect














































We can now solve the ﬁrst-order conditions of the quantity stage, (2) and (3), for C′
j and
C′
I, and insert them into (9). Similarly, inserting C′
j and C′
I from (2) and (3) into the ﬁrst-order
conditions from the capacity stage, (5) and (6), and solving them for Cj and CI, we can replace





























This inequality has a similar structure as (7). The left-hand side is again the equilibrium ratio
of the response of kj to a change in k over the response of kI. The right-hand side is now
diﬀerent because when considering social welfare we have to take into account that the cost
structure and therefore the absolute value of overall costs changes as k varies. Nevertheless,
one can show that for any ﬁnite N there exists a k∗
W > 0 such that for all k < k∗
W vertical
integration is welfare increasing at the margin. It is also possible that vertical integration to
monopoly increases overall welfare.30
30A formal statement and a sketch of the proof are in Appendix B [not intended for publication].
19The intuition is similar to the one for Propositions 1 and 2. If the ex ante degree of vertical
integration is low, further vertical integration increases ﬁnal output and has the eﬀect of shifting
production to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm. Therefore, it is welfare increasing. On the other hand,
if k is already very large, the overall quantity may decrease and, in addition, the less eﬃcient
ﬁrm produces more, which raises production costs even for a given quantity.
We can also show a result that is akin to Proposition 3: If R′(K) is large or if the model is
linear-quadratic, then for any ﬁnite N there either exists a unique k∗
W ∈ (0, ¯ k) so that vertical
integration is welfare enhancing at the margin for all k < k∗
W and welfare reducing at the
margin for all k > k∗
W, or vertical integration is always welfare enhancing.31
The analysis so far resembles the one of the previous section. However, the threshold value
of k obtained in the welfare analysis is diﬀerent from the one obtained for consumer surplus
because, as mentioned, the variable costs of production and the opportunity costs of capacity
change with an increase in k. Since the rise in kI caused by an increase in k is larger than the
fall in aggregate capacity of non-integrated ﬁrms, K is increasing in k and so capacity costs
are increasing. If, in addition, ﬁrm I utilizes its capacity less intensively than a non-integrated
ﬁrm, we know that overall production costs must increase. In this case the set of k for which
vertical integration is welfare enhancing is smaller than the one for which it is procompetitive.
The next proposition conﬁrms that for the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation such a case can indeed
occur.
Proposition 6 In the linear-quadratic case, there either exists a unique ˆ γ such that k∗
W < k∗
for all γ < ˆ γ and k∗
W > k∗ for all γ > ˆ γ, or k∗
W < k∗ for all γ.
This result implies that if the cost advantage of the integrated ﬁrm is small, i.e., γ < ˆ γ, and
the ex ante degree of integration is between k∗
W and k∗, vertical integration beneﬁts consumers
but lowers social welfare. The intuition is that for small γ, ﬁrm I utilizes its capacity less
intensively than a non-integrated ﬁrm at k∗. As a consequence, vertical integration increases
overall production costs at k∗ for constant aggregate quantity. Thus, even if aggregate quantity
increases slightly, the eﬀect of increased production costs dominates and welfare falls. The result
is interesting since it seems natural to conjecture that procompetitive vertical integration also
improves welfare because ﬁrms’ proﬁts should rise as the industry becomes more integrated.
However, what is missing in this reasoning is that vertical integration shifts production costs







Figure 5: The critical output market share of the integrated ﬁrm s∗(N,γ) for γ = 0, 0.05 and
γ = 0.1 in the linear-quadratic model.
between ﬁrms. Proposition 6 shows that this eﬀect can be so large that procompetitive but
welfare reducing mergers are possible.
On the other hand, if the cost advantage of the integrated ﬁrm is suﬃciently large, verti-
cal integration may shift production to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm. In this case, anticompetitive
but welfare enhancing mergers occur for k ∈ (k∗,k∗
W), provided that k∗ < k∗
W. Although
overall quantity decreases, this smaller quantity is now produced more eﬃciently. This result
is also consistent with Riordan’s (1998) ﬁnding that welfare increasing but anticompetitive
vertical integration is possible if the cost advantage of the dominant ﬁrm is large. However,
procompetitive but welfare reducing mergers cannot occur in the dominant ﬁrm model.
Another important issue for practical application is to derive conclusions about the welfare
eﬀects of vertical integration that are based on observable market conditions.32 For the linear-
quadratic speciﬁcation, one can numerically compute the critical input or output market shares
of the integrated ﬁrm, given the thresholds k∗ and k∗
W, beyond which further vertical integration
reduces consumer surplus or social welfare. Figure 5 plots the threshold market shares s∗(N,γ)
for the integrated ﬁrm’s downstream market share beyond which vertical integration becomes
anticompetitive on the margin as a function of N for diﬀerent values of γ. In line with our
previous results we obtain that the critical input and output market shares fall in the number
of ﬁrms. In addition, these critical market shares are almost identical, which implies that it is
enough for competition authorities to look at only one of these shares.
32A particularly nice feature of Riordan’s (1998) dominant ﬁrm model is that it establishes an indicator about
the welfare eﬀects of vertical integration that holds for general functions and is based on the ratio of input to
output market shares.
216 Conclusion
We have analyzed a model in which the eﬀects of vertical integration on consumer and overall
welfare depend on the underlying market structure. We have shown that, perhaps surprisingly,
vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive exactly when the market structure
is more concentrated. More generally, in our model vertical integration is procompetitive
under fairly wide circumstances since eﬃciency eﬀects tend to dominate foreclosure eﬀects.
Because of this, even vertical integration to monopoly can be procompetitive. However, vertical
integration can also be consumer welfare increasing but total welfare reducing at the same time
because ﬁnal output may be produced at higher costs after integration. Our numerical results
also indicate that—within the conﬁnes of our model—the eﬀects of seemingly intuitive but
ultimately misguided policy recommendations can be sizeable.
Assuming that ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products in the downstream market is an inter-
esting avenue for future research. Downstream market interaction between ﬁrms is smaller in
this case, which suggests that the quantity reduction by non-integrated ﬁrms following vertical
integration will be smaller as well. However, this leaves open the question of how sensitive the
reaction of non-integrated ﬁrms is to increases in the price of capacity. In general, it seems
plausible that the theme that emerges from our analysis—that vertical integration tends to
be procompetitive if the market exhibits little competition and anticompetitive if the market
is otherwise highly competitive—will be echoed in this case. Another interesting avenue for
future work is to endogenize the market structure by additionally allowing non-integrated ﬁrms
to enter and exit.
22Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1




















We can write dQ/dkj as dQ/dkj = dqI/dkj +
 
h =j dqh/dkj + dqj/dkj, which under the sym-













Therefore, (11) can be written as an equation that depends on the three variables dqh/dkj,
dqj/dkj and dqI/dkj, which we wish to determine.
Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm h, which is analogous to (2), with






























The system of the three equations (11), (12) and (13) is linear in the three unknowns dqh/dkj,
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33To simplify notation, we omit the superscript ∗ on equilibrium quantities and equilibrium capacities through-
out this appendix.







I qjkjN) > 0. The inequality sign follows from P′′ being negative or not too positive.



































respectively, where under symmetry dQ/dkI = dqI/dkI +Ndqj/dkI. Using the last equation to
replace dQ/dkI in (17) and (18) yields a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns

















Again, the inequality sign follows from P′′ not being too positive. ￿
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1 we know that qi(ˆ ki,k−i) > qi(ki,k−i) ⇔ ˆ ki > ki. Now suppose to the contrary
of the claim in the lemma that qi(ˆ ki,k−i)/ˆ ki ≥ qi(ki,k−i)/ki. Since C′′
i > 0, this is equivalent
to the right-hand sides of (2) and (3) being weakly greater for ˆ ki than for ki.
Now we can turn to the left-hand side of (2) and (3), respectively. From (1) we can calculate

















Since P′ < 0, the ﬁrst term of the left-hand side of (2) and (3) is smaller for ˆ ki than for ki.
Also, since qi(ˆ ki,k−i) > qi(ki,k−i), P′ < 0 and P′′ is negative or not too positive, the second
term on the left-hand side of (2) and (3) is either smaller for ˆ ki than for ki or only slightly
bigger. Therefore, the left-hand sides of (2), and (3), are strictly smaller for ˆ ki than ki, which
is the desired contradiction. ￿
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3



























































































− 2R′ − (kI − k)R′′ < 0,
with h  = j, h,j = 1,...,N. In the following we show that (20) is indeed fulﬁlled when the
ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed. The second-order condition for the integrated ﬁrm can then
be shown to be fulﬁlled in exactly the same way.
In the proof of Lemma 1 we determined the equilibrium expressions for dqi/dkj, i =
I,1,...,N, that appear in (20). To determine the sign of ∂2Πj/∂k2
j we still have to determine
d2qI/dk2
j and d2qh/dk2
j. To that end we now state the expressions for dqI/dkj and dqh/dkj
without imposing symmetry, i.e. explicitly distinguishing between non-integrated ﬁrm h and
j, that is between qh and qj, kh and kj and C′′
h and C′′
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h(qjkjC′′
j + qIkIC′′




Diﬀerentiating both equations of (22) with respect to kj, using dqh/dkj, dqj/dkj and dqI/dkj

















j − kjP′)3η3 − 2R′ − kjR′′,
(23)
where we have used that in equilibrium qh = qj, kh = kj and C′′
h = C′′
j . In equation (23)
κsh = κsh(qj,kj,qI,kI,C′′
j ,C′′
I ,P′,P′′,N), s ∈ {1,...,9} and h ∈ {1,...,7}. We do not specify
the exact expressions for κsh here since they stand for rather complex expressions consisting
of several terms. Yet, in each case the sign of these expressions is easy to determine and this




j (which is the case in equilibrium),
these formulas yield the expressions in (19).
25is the only point of relevance for our purpose. These signs are the following: For h = {1,2,3}
κsh ≥ 0, if both s and h are either even or odd and κsh ≤ 0 if one is even and the other
one is odd. κs4, κs5, κs6 ≥ 0 for s even and κs4, κs5, κs6 ≤ 0 for s odd. κs7 > 0 for s even
and κs7 < 0 for s odd. Thus, the numerator in the fraction is positive because P′′ is not too
positive and P′′′ and C′′′ are not too negative. Since η > 0, the denominator is positive as well.
Therefore, the ﬁrst term in (23) is negative. Since R′′ is not too negative as well, we get that
∂2Πj/∂k2
j < 0. In exactly the same way we can show that the second-order condition for ﬁrm
I is satisﬁed. Thus, the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm is quasiconcave in its own capacity and we
have an interior equilibrium.
We now turn to the question of uniqueness. From Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) and Vives
(1999) we know that the equilibrium is unique if and only if the Jacobian determinant of minus
the marginal proﬁts is positive. In our case this determinant is given by
|J| =
   
   
 
   
   





























   
   
 
   
   
   
 
, (24)
with h  = j, h,j = 1,...,N. The terms that determine this determinant are given by the second-
order conditions, (20) and (21), and the terms ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kI), ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kh), ∂2Πh/(∂kh∂kj),
∂2ΠI/(∂kI∂kj) and ∂2ΠI/(∂kI∂kh). Because of symmetry we know that in equilibrium ∂2Πh/(∂kh∂kj) =




























































































































− R′ − (kI − k)R′′,
The second derivatives that appear in these expressions can be derived in the same way as
above where we checked that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed.
26Proceeding in a similar way as Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), i.e. subtracting the ﬁrst
column in (24) from the other columns, and then dividing the i-th row by ∂2Πi/∂ki∂kj −
∂2Πi/∂k2
i , with i = I,1,...,N, yields
|J| =
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We can then calculate the determinant in a relatively straightforward way. Cumbersome but
otherwise routine manipulations show that this determinant is unambiguously positive and,
therefore, that the equilibrium of the capacity stage is unique. ￿
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4


























































































The terms that appear in these expressions are given by (20), (21), (25), (26), (27) and by
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂k
= R′ > 0.
Tedious but routine calculations then show that all terms in (25), (26) and (27) have a
negative sign. Thus, the numerators of the fractions on the right-hand side of (28) and (29)
27are both negative. The denominator in these fractions is the same in both equations. It is easy
to show that |∂2Πj/∂k2














In addition one can also easily show that |∂2ΠI/∂k2













The inequalities in (30) and (31) then imply that the denominator is positive. As a consequence,
we get that dkj/dk < 0 and dkI/dk > 0. ￿
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the right-hand side of (8). Suppose ﬁrst that γ = 0. As mentioned in the main
text, if k = 0, the right-hand side of (8) simpliﬁes to −1/N.
We now turn to the left-hand side of (8). From equations (28) and (29) we obtain that it















+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kh
< 0, h  = j, h,j = 1,...,N. (32)
At γ = 0 and k = 0, we know that there is no diﬀerence between ﬁrm I and any of the
non-integrated ﬁrms. This implies that ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kh) = ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kI). Now, since all the
second derivatives appearing in (32) are known to be negative (from the proof of Lemma 4),
(dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) > −1/N is equivalent to ∂2Πj/∂k2
j − ∂2Πj/∂kj∂kI < 0. Since at k = 0














































In the proof of Lemma 1 we determined dqj/dkj and dqh/dkj. Evaluating these expressions




























28Determining the second derivatives (d2qh)/(dk2
j), (d2qI)/(dkjdkI) and (d2qh)/(dkjdkI) and us-
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j − 3qjP′′kj) < 0.
That is, ∂2Πj/∂k2
j is larger in absolute terms than (∂2Πj)/(∂kj∂kI). As a consequence,
(dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) > −1/N, which implies that the left-hand side of (8) is larger than the
right-hand side. Thus, at γ = 0 and k = 0 vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin.
We now turn to the case γ > 0. From (5) and (6) we know that if qI = qj, we have kI = kj
at k = 0. But since γ > 0, equations (2) and (3) imply qI > qj at kI = kj. Together with (5)
and (6) this in turn implies that kI > kj. But one can show that nevertheless qI/kI > qj/kj
because qI > qj is a ﬁrst-order eﬀect. Thus, at k = 0 and γ > 0, ﬁrm I utilizes capacity more
eﬃciently. This implies that a shift in capacity to ﬁrm I is also procompetitive for γ > 0. By
continuity it follows that vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin for all k below a
certain, positive threshold denoted by k∗. ￿
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We show that for any ﬁnite N there either exists a k∗∗ < ¯ k, such that vertical integration is
anticompetitive at the margin for all k > k∗∗, or it is procompetitive at the margin for all k
close to ¯ k.
Let k = ¯ k, so that kj = 0 for all j  = I. We ﬁrst have to determine qj/kj in this
case. Because Cj is strictly convex, C′
j is invertible and equation (2) can be written as
qj = kjC′−1
j (P(Q) + P′(Q)qj). It follows directly that if kj = 0 we also have qj = 0.
Observe that the inverse C′−1
j (.) is strictly increasing and that it is zero if and only if its
argument is zero. By using the rule of L’Hˆ opital we get qj/kj = C′−1
j (P(qI)) > 0, if qj = 0
and kj = 0. To simplify notation in the following we denote ρ ≡ C′−1
j (P(qI)).









29The left-hand side of (8) in case of qj = kj = 0 can be calculated from (28) and (29). To
do so we ﬁrst have to determine the second derivatives in (20), (21), (25), (26) and (27) at
qj = kj = 0. From the right-hand side of (20) we know that ∂2Πj/∂k2



























We can then calculate dqI/dkj, dqh/dkj and dqj/dkj at qj = kj = 0 from (15) and (16). Taking














Calculating the second term of the right-hand side in (34) at qj = kj = 0 gives us, again by














ρ2P′(3kIP′ + qIkIP′′ − 2C′′
I )
2kIP′ + qIkIP′′ − C′′
I
.







2kIP′ + qIkIP′′ − C′′
I
− 2R′. (35)
In the same way we can determine the expressions for ∂2ΠI/∂k2
I, ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kI), ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kh)














I − kIP′) + σ
 , (36)
with σ ≡ R′kI (2P′kI + P′′kIqI − C′′


































But the left-hand side of (37) can either be larger or smaller than the right-hand side. To
see this suppose ﬁrst that σ is small in absolute terms. In this case, the second term of the
left-hand side is approximately the same as the right-hand side. But since −N/(1 + N) > −1,
the left-hand side is larger. On the other hand, suppose that N is very large. In this case,






















kI < 0, the inequality in (38) is fulﬁlled. By continuity, vertical integration can
be procompetitive at the margin for all k close to ¯ k. ￿
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Case (i): We ﬁrst look at the right-hand side of (8). Diﬀerentiating it with respect to k reveals

































































From Lemma 4 we know that dkI/dk > 0 and dkj/dk < 0. Because of Lemma 2 this implies
that d(qI/kI)/dk < 0 and d(qj/kj)/dk > 0. Since qj/kj > qI/kI, the ﬁrst term in (39) is
positive. Also, since dkI/dk > 0 and dkj/dk < 0, the second term is positive as well.
Now let us turn to the third term. Since C′′′ is positive or not very negative, we get that
dC′′
j /dk is also positive or not very negative while dC′′
I /dk is negative or not very positive.
Therefore, the third term is either positive, or, if it is negative, then only slightly so. As a
consequence, the sum of the ﬁrst three terms in (39) is positive.
Now let us look at the fourth term. Since kj < kI and C′′
I < C′′
j the last term in brackets is
negative. Since P′′ is negative or not too positive we have that for dQ/dk ≥ 0 the fourth term
is positive or only slightly negative.
But in sum this implies that (39) is positive and thus the right-hand side of (8) is strictly
increasing in k if dQ/dk ≥ 0.
Now we turn to the left-hand side of (8) which is given by (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk). If R′ is
relatively large, we get, after inserting (20), (21) and (25) into (32), that (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) =
−1/(N + 1). Thus, the left-hand side of (8) does not vary with k. Since we know that the
right-hand side is smaller than the left-hand side at k = 0 and since the right-hand side is
strictly increasing at any point of intersection, there can at most be one such point.
31Case (ii): We ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium in the linear-quadratic case. The proﬁt function
of the integrated ﬁrm in this case can be written as
ΠI =














and the one of a non-integrated ﬁrm j as
Πj =














Diﬀerentiating with respect to qI and qj and solving for the equilibrium quantities yields
qI =
(β (α + (N + 1)γ)kj + c(γ + α))kI
β(βkj(N + 2) + 2c)kI + c2 + kjβc(N + 1)
and qj =
(βkI(α − γ) + cα)kj
β(βkj(N + 2) + 2c)kI + c2 + kjβc(N + 1)
.
After substituting these quantities into the respective proﬁt functions, we can take derivatives
of ΠI with respect to kI and of Πj with respect to kj.35 The equilibrium capacities kI is then
implicitly deﬁned by
 
c2(c + kj(1 + N)β)
  
c2(γ + α)2 + 2c((γ + α)β(α + γ(1 + N)) − Nδc2)kj (42)
+β((α + γ(1 + N))2β − 4N(1 + N)δc2)k2









θ0 = 2δ(β2(2 + N)kjkI + β(N + 1)kjc + 2βckI + c2)3,
θ1 = (6β4δNc(2 + N)(1 + N)2k4
j − β3((2 + 3N)(α + (N + 1)γ)2β − 4δc2(1 + N)(7N2 + 11N + 1))k3
j
−2β2c((α + (N + 1)γ)(3α(N + 1) + γ(3 + 4N))β − 3δc2(7N2 + 10N + 2))k2
j
−βc2((γ + α)((7N + 6)γ + 3α(N + 2))β − 12δc2(2N + 1))kj − 2c3(β(α + γ)2 − 2δc2)),
θ2 = (6β5δNc(1 + N)(2 + N)2k4
j + 6β4δc2(2 + N)(N2 + 10N + 2)k3
j
+24β3δc3(2N + 3)(2N + 1)k2
j + 12β2δc4(7N + 6)kj + 24βδc5),
θ3 = 2β2δ(k2
jβ2N(2 + N) + 2βkjc(4N + 3) + 6c2)(kjβ(N + 2) + 2c)2,
θ4 = 4β3δ(kjβ(N + 2) + 2c)3.
while the equilibrium capacity qj is implicitly deﬁned by
c3(2kIβ + c)(β(−8c2δ + β(α − γ)2)k2
I + 2c(βα(α − γ) − c2δ)k1 + c2α2 − 8β2cδk3
I)
35As before, we have to distinguish between kj and kh h  = j, h,j = 1,...,N. Of course, in equilibrium we will




I − β3((α − γ)2(6 + N)β − 16c2δ(7 + 4N))k3
I− (43)










τ1 = cβ(12β4cδ(N + 4)(N + 2)k4
I + β3(−(α − γ)2(2 + 3N)β + 2c2δ(116N + 104 + 27N2))k3
I
+β2c((α − γ)((3N − 1)γ − 3(3 + N)α)β + 6c2δ(39N + 28 + 12N2))k2
I
+βc2(α(2(3N − 1)γ − 9Nα)β + 12c2δ(3N + 5)(N + 1))kI + c3(((1 − 3N)α2)β + 2c2δ(3N + 4)(N + 1)))
τ2 = 2β2δc((2 + N)kIβ + (N + 1)c)(β3(N + 8)(N + 2)k3
I + cβ2(8N2 + 45N + 40)k2
I
+2c2β(5N + 14)(N + 1)kI + 3c3(N + 2)(N + 1)),
τ3 = 2β3δ((2β2(1 + N))k2
I + cβ(N + 9)(N + 1)kI + c2(N + 4)(N + 1))((2 + N)kIβ + (1 + N)c)2k4
j,
τ4 = 2β4δ(N + 1)((N + 2)kIβ + (N + 1)c)3.
We now turn to the competitive eﬀects of a change in k. Since Q = qI +Nqj, we can insert
the above explicit solutions for the quantities and diﬀerentiate Q with respect to k. From this






(kjβ + c)(β(γ(N + 1) + α)kj + c(γ + α))
N(kIβ + c)((β(α − γ))kI + cα)
. (44)
Via diﬀerentiating (42) and (43) with respect to kj, kI and k and solving for dkj/dk and dkI/dk,
we can calculate the left-hand side of (44). Subtracting the right-hand side from the left-hand








where υuz = υuz(α,β,γ,δ,c,N). We do not spell out the exact expressions for υuz, u ∈
{1,...,6}, z ∈ {1,...,5} because they are rather complicated. As will become clear, we are
mainly interested in determining their signs and compare them, which can be done relatively
easily.

































33where, from Lemma 4, dkj/dk < 0 and dkI/dk > 0.





I(dkj/dk)) for u > z are all negative. The expressions for υuz with u < z can have
diﬀerent signs. So let us ﬁrst take each term υuz(zku
j kz−1
I (dkI/dk) + uku−1
j kz
I(dkj/dk)), where
z = za > ua = u. Now we compare it with the corresponding expression where u = za and
z = ua. One can then show that the latter expression is larger than the former in absolute
values in any comparison. Therefore, the sum of each of the comparisons is negative. Finally,
we have to look at terms with u = z. Again, υuz can be positive or negative, i.e. υuz > 0
for u = z = 1,2,3, υuz < 0 for u = z = 4 and υuz = 0 for u = z = 5. Now for any of
these expressions υuz(zku
j kz−1
I (dkI/dk) + uku−1
j kz
I(dkj/dk)) with u = z we can ﬁnd a previous
comparison, to which we can add the expression and the resulting sum still stays negative.
Thus, equation (45) is strictly decreasing in k. Since at k = 0, the left-hand side of (44) is
larger than the right-hand side, we know that there exists either a unique intersection or no
intersection between the terms on the two sides. ￿
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst show that qj → 0 and kj → 0, j  = I, as N → ∞. Suppose to the contrary that
qj > 0. But since Q = qI + Nqj and P(Q) ≤ 0, as N → ∞, the ﬁrst-order condition for
ﬁrm j given by (2) cannot be satisﬁed if qj > 0, since the right-hand side is positive while the
left-hand side would be negative. Therefore, qj → 0, as N → ∞. Given this, suppose now
that kj > 0. But then in the ﬁrst-order condition of the capacity stage, (5), the left-hand side
would be negative while the right-hand side is zero. In order to fulﬁll this condition we must
have kj → 0. Therefore, as N → ∞, qj → 0 and kj → 0.
In the proof of Proposition 2 we already calculated the case of qj → 0 and kj → 0. Taking
















where ρ and σ are deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 2. But we already showed in this proof
that the inequality is fulﬁlled. Therefore, vertical integration is anticompetitive if N → ∞. ￿
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
From the proof of Proposition 3 we know that the left-hand side of (8), (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk),
equals −1/(N + 1) if R′ is relatively large. Multiplying (8) by N, the left-hand side is given
34−N/(N + 1). Taking the derivative with respect to N, we obtain −1/(N + 1)2 < 0, implying
that the left-hand side is decreasing with N.









To take the derivative of (46) we need to determine ∂kj/∂N from (5) and ∂kI/∂N from (6) and
use these derivatives to calculate ∂qj/∂N from (2) and ∂qI/∂N from (3), taking into account


































I ) + C′′
I C′′
j ).
Taking the derivative of (46) and using the above expressions, we obtain, under the addi-
tional assumptions (i) C′′′ is relatively small and (ii) C′′
j ≈ C′′
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j (kjN + kI) − P′′(qjN(kI − kj)2 + qI(k2





 2  
C′′
j (3kj(N + 1) + kI(N + 5)) − 2P′′kjkI(qI + Nqj)
 
.
But since P′′ is negative or not too positive, the derivative is positive, implying that (46) is
falling in N.
From the previous analysis we know that k∗ is given by the intersection of the left-hand side
and the right-hand side of (8). As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, if R′ is very large, the
left-hand side is constant in k while the right-hand side is increasing at the point of intersection.
Now we just showed that the left-hand side is lower if N is larger while the right-hand side is
larger if N is larger. But this implies that the two sides cross each other at a lower value of k
if N is larger. Since k∗(N) is deﬁned as the point of interestion, it follows that it is decreasing
in N. ￿
35A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
We know that welfare is increasing in k if and only if (9) holds. The ﬁrst term on the left-hand
side of (9), PdQ/dk, has the same sign as the condition for pro- or anticompetitive vertical
integration. Therefore, we know that it is zero at k∗. As a consequence, if the rest of the
left-hand side is negative at k∗, this implies that k∗
WF < k∗.
We start with the case of γ = 0. In this case γ(dqI/dk) = 0. The term −R(dK/dk) is




































are negative at k∗, we have established that k∗
WF < k∗ at γ = 0. We can now use the respective
expressions for the cost functions and the equilibrium values of qj and qI in the linear-quadratic
case that we calculated in the proof of Proposition 3, case (ii). Inserting them into (47) and






Iβ2(2c − βkj(N + 2)) + kIcβ(c − βkj(2N + 5)) + c2(c − βkj(N + 1))











β2c(N + 1) − kIβ3(N + 2)
 
+kjcβ (c(2 − N) − kIβ(3N + 4))−2kIc2β+c3
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Inserting the last equation into (48) and simplifying gives
−
2αcβ(kI − kj)(c + βkj)(kIβ(2c + kjβ(N + 2)) + c(c + kjβ(N + 1)))
(c + βkI)
,
which is negative because kI > kj at k∗. Thus, we have shown that k∗
WF < k∗ at γ = 0.
Now we turn to the case γ > 0. Writing (9) under the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation for the





(kIβ(2c + kjβ(N + 2)) + c(c + kjβ(N + 1)))
3
+cγ





















N(αc + βkI(α − γ))(k2
Iβ2(α − γ)(2c − βkj(N + 2))







+[c(α + γ) + kjαβ + βγkj(N + 1)]
 
k2
j(α + γ(N + 1))
 
β2c(N + 1) − kIβ3(N + 2)
 
+kjcβ (c(2(α + γ) − N(α − 2γ)) − kIβ(α(3N + 4) + γ(N + 4))) − 2kIc2β(α + γ) + c3(α + γ)
 
.






(kjβ + c)(β(γ(N + 1) + α)kj + c(γ + α))
N(kIβ + c)((β(α − γ))kI + cα)
.
Inserting this into (49), diﬀerentiating the resulting expression with respect to γ and using the
fact that dkI/dγ > 0 and dkj/dγ < 0 reveals that the expression is strictly increasing in γ.
But from the ﬁrst part of the proof we know that (49) evaluated at k = k∗ is negative at γ = 0
which implies that k∗
WF < k∗. Therefore, we have shown there exists either a unique value of
γ denoted by ˆ γ such that k∗
WF < k∗ for all γ < ˆ γ and k∗
WF > k∗ for all γ > ˆ γ, or no such value
exists because (49) turns positive only at such high values of γ at which the non-integrated
ﬁrms are not active. In the latter case k∗
WF < k∗ for all γ. ￿
B Additional Material (not intended for publication)
In this appendix (which is not intended for publication) we provide additional results based on
numerical calculations for the linear-quadratic model.
B.1 k
∗ as a function of N and γ
Figure 6 summarizes the results from the numerical computations. It plots the competitive
threshold, here denoted k∗(N,γ), as a function of N and γ for the linear quadratic model for
γ ∈ {0,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2}.36 It complements Figure 1 by adding results for values of γ > 0.
Since k∗ decreases in N, these results also show that Riordan’s (1998) dominant ﬁrm model
becomes an increasingly better approximation as the downstream industry becomes more and
more competitive.
36All simulations were done in Python and are available upon request. In Figure 6 we set the parameters α,
β, c and δ equal to one.
37N
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Figure 6: The competitive threshold k∗(N,γ) for γ ∈ {0,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2}.
Figure 6 also reveals that vertical integration is procompetitive for a larger set of k the
larger is γ because increases in γ result in upward shifts of k∗.37 The intuition is that the
integrated ﬁrm utilizes its capacity to a larger degree if its cost advantage is bigger. Therefore,
capacity is shifted to the more eﬃcient ﬁrm which makes vertical integration more likely to be
procompetitive.
B.2 Sketch of the proof of Subsection 4.4
The competitive eﬀects of vertical integration can still be evaluated using (8). If all ﬁrms are
integrated, the right-hand side of (8) is the same but the left-hand side may diﬀer.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, if all ﬁrms including ﬁrm I are vertically integrated to
the same extent, (8) can be evaluated by determining ∂2Πj/∂k2
j − ∂2Πj/∂kj∂kI. These two
expressions are given by (20) and (25) but with the diﬀerence that in both expressions the last
term is now given by (kj − kn)R′′ instead of kjR′′. However, since this change is the same in
both expressions, the diﬀerence between the two is still the same as in our main analysis. Thus,
the proof of Proposition 1 goes through in exactly the same way.
It is easy to check that kn plays no role in the proof of Propostion 2 since kj = 0 there,
that is, all (partially) integrated ﬁrms 1,...,n no sell their quantity to ﬁrm I or to an outside
37Each curve k
∗(N,γ) also exhibits a ﬂat segment initially. This ﬂat part corresponds to the smallest value
of k such that the non-integrated competitors stop production (in our notation ¯ k), at which we stopped our
simulations. For any k > ¯ k, vertical integration is procompetitive simply because it reduces the cost of the only
active ﬁrm. The fact that the curves k
∗(N,γ) intersect for small values of N does therefore not conﬂict with the
statement that vertical integration is procompetitive for a larger set of k the larger is γ.
38market. The ame holds for the proof of Proposition 4.
Tedious but standard calculations that closely follow those of the proof of Proposition 3
show that the arguments used there also hold if all ﬁrms are vertically integrated. This is the
case because the proofs of cases (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 depend on the equilibrium capacities
and quantities and not on the degree of integration. Although the degree of integration aﬀecs
the equilibrium, the calculations are very similar.
B.3 Omitted Propositions and Proofs of Section 5
The next proposition presents the result that similar statements as the ones given in Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 hold for the welfare analysis:
Proposition 7 For any ﬁnite N there exists a k∗
W > 0 such that for all k < k∗
W vertical
integration is welfare increasing at the margin. There also either exists a k∗∗
W < ¯ k such that for
all k > k∗∗
W vertical integration is welfare decreasing at the margin, or it is welfare increasing
at the margin for any k close to ¯ k.
Sketch of the proof We start with the case where k = 0 and γ = 0. In the proof of
Proposition 1 we calculated the left-hand side of (10). To determine the right-hand side of
(10) we ﬁrst insert dQ/dkI = dqI/dkI + Ndqj/dkI, dQ−I/dkI = Ndqj/dkI and dQ/dkj =
dqI/dkj + dqj/dkj + (N − 1)dqh/dkj into the right-hand side and then use equations (14),
(15), (16) and (19) from the proof of Lemma 1, i.e., the derivatives of qi with respect to kj,
i,j = I,1,...,N. Knowing that at k = 0 and γ = 0 we have qI = qj, kI = kj and C′′
I = C′′
j ,
the right-hand side simpliﬁes to −1/N. But from the proof of Proposition 1 we know that the
left-hand side is larger than −1/N at k = 0 and γ = 0. Therefore, marginal vertical integration
is welfare increasing at this point. In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1 we can
show that it is also welfare increasing for γ > 0. By continuity there exists a threshold k∗
W
such that vertical integration is welfare enhancing at the margin for all k < k∗
W.














I − kIP′) + σ
 .
Proceeding in the same way as above to determine the right-hand side of (10) but now inserting




I − kIR′ (C′′










where the equality sign is due to σ ≡ R′kI(2P′kI + P′′kIqI − C′′
I ) as deﬁned in the proof of
Proposition 2. Subtracting (50) from (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) then reveals that this diﬀerence has
the same sign as
−kI(1 + N)σ2 − σP′  
C′′











I (N + 1) − kIP′(2N + 1) − kIqINP′′ 






The ﬁrst three terms in this expression are negative while the last term is positive. There-
fore, if the ex ante capacity that is needed to induce the non-integrated ﬁrms to stop producing,
¯ k, is small, the fourth term is small as well. In this case the expression is negative and welfare
is decreasing at k = ¯ k. By continuity there then exists a k∗∗
W such that for all k > k∗∗
W vertical
integration is welfare reducing at the margin. If instead ¯ k is relatively large, the fourth term
dominates the ﬁrst three terms. The expression is then positive and vertical integration is
welfare enhancing at the margin. ￿
The next result is akin to Proposition 3:
Proposition 8 Suppose either that (i) R(K) is very inelastic or that (ii) the model is linear-
quadratic. Then, for any ﬁnite N there either exists a unique k∗
W ∈ (0,¯ k) such that vertical
integration is welfare enhancing at the margin for all k < k∗
W and welfare reducing at the
margin for all k > k∗
W, or vertical integration is always welfare enhancing.





















































40Inserting this into the last expression and using the fact that R′ is dominating all other deriva-
tives yields R′(−Nkj+(N+1)(kI−k))/(N+2) > 0. Diﬀerentiating the left-hand side of the last
equation with respect to k and using (52) yields d(R′(−Nkj + (N + 1)(kI − k))/(N + 2))/dk =
−R′/(N +2)2 < 0. Therefore, the term that determines the sign of (51) is strictly decreasing in
k. Since welfare is increasing in k at k = 0, there is either a unique intersection point or none.
The proof for case (ii) proceeds along the same lines as the proof of case (ii) in Proposition
3 and is therefore omitted. ￿
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